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Abstract 
The nature of our moral judgments – and the extent to which we treat others with care – 
depend in part on the distinctions we make between entities deemed worthy or unworthy of 
moral consideration – our moral boundaries. Philosophers, historians and social scientists 
have noted that people’s moral boundaries have expanded over the last few centuries, but the 
notion of moral expansiveness has received limited empirical attention in psychology. This 
research explores variations in the size of individuals’ moral boundaries using the 
psychological construct of moral expansiveness, and introduces the Moral Expansiveness 
Scale (MES) designed to capture this variation. Across six studies we established the 
reliability, convergent validity, and predictive validity of the MES. Moral expansiveness was 
related (but not reducible) to existing moral constructs (moral foundations, moral identity, 
“moral” universalism values), predictors of moral standing (moral patiency and warmth) and 
other constructs associated with concern for others (empathy, identification with humanity, 
connectedness to nature, and social responsibility). Importantly, the MES uniquely predicted 
willingness to engage in pro-social intentions and behaviors at personal cost independently of 
these established constructs. Specifically, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to 
prioritize humanitarian and environmental concerns over personal and national self-interest, 
willingness to sacrifice one’s life to save others (ranging from human outgroups to animals 
and plants), and volunteering behavior. Results demonstrate that moral expansiveness is a 
distinct and important factor in understanding moral judgments and their consequences.  
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In 2008, Spain took steps to become the first country to extend basic “human” rights 
to great apes (e.g., right to life, freedom from torture; Glendinning, 2008). In 2012, the 
Whanganui River in New Zealand was officially granted legal personhood status, being 
recognized as a “person” with its own “rights and interests” under law (Fairbrother, 2012). 
More recently, Pope Francis addressed the United Nations general assembly on the inherent 
rights of the environment, arguing that all living creatures possess intrinsic value 
(Goldenberg & Kirchgaessne, 2015). These examples of granting rights typically reserved for 
people to non-human entities illustrate a general point noted by prominent theorists: moral 
boundaries – the distinction between those entities that are deemed worthy of moral 
consideration and those that are not – are expanding over time (Bloom, 2010; Glover, 1999; 
Lecky, 1869; Pinker, 2011; Singer, 1981).  
Although there may be a general trend towards more expansive moral boundaries, 
people’s reactions to granting moral concern to entities such as rivers and animals are likely 
to differ widely. Some people may view granting moral consideration to animals and rivers as 
absurd and nonsensical, whereas others may believe that moral concern should extend even 
further. The extent to which people are expansive in their moral concern is a critical issue, as 
moral judgments and the ethical treatment of others depend on where people’s moral 
boundaries end (Pizarro, Detweiler-Bedell, & Bloom, 2006). Entities outside the moral 
boundary can be subjected to horrific treatment with little concern for their welfare (e.g., live-
cattle trade, the Holocaust), and important social and political debates often focus on entities 
that may sit on the margins of moral boundaries (e.g., fetuses and abortion). Therefore, it is 
important to develop an understanding of individual differences in the extension of moral 
concern, and the correlates and consequences of being more or less morally expansive.  
Although there have been philosophical (Singer, 1981) and historical (Pinker, 2011) 
examinations of moral expansiveness, there is no established measure assessing individual 
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differences in the size of a person’s moral world. In response to this, we develop an approach 
to understanding moral expansiveness by measuring individual variation in the extent of 
people’s moral concern for others, and identifying its psychological implications. 
Specifically, the current research develops and validates a measure of moral expansiveness – 
the Moral Expansiveness Scale – and demonstrates that moral expansiveness is an important 
and unique predictor of moral attitudes and behavior.  
What is Moral Expansiveness? 
Moral expansiveness refers to the breadth of entities deemed worthy of moral concern 
and treatment. A less morally expansive person restricts concern to those entities that are 
considered ‘close’ (e.g., their family). A more morally expansive person extends moral care 
and consideration beyond these boundaries to more ‘distant’ entities (e.g., animals or plants). 
Therefore, moral expansiveness captures the willingness to extend moral concern to others 
(the “breadth” of a person’s moral world).  
Critical to our understanding of moral expansiveness is a graded approach to 
measuring the intensity of people’s moral concern for different entities. Singer (1981) 
characterized the moral circle as a boundary distinguishing those entities deemed worthy of 
moral consideration from those that are not. However, as noted by Pizarro et al. (2006), an 
either/or approach to understanding moral inclusion fails to account for the graded and 
multifaceted nature of moral concern. “Moral concern” can span from believing an entity’s 
rights and wellbeing take precedence over all other considerations, to a perception that their 
needs and rights are worthy of limited consideration without being a primary concern. Our 
approach to moral expansiveness recognizes this “depth” of a person’s moral world, such that 
some people will show a higher level of moral concern than others for the same entity. 
Accordingly, our approach to measuring moral expansiveness incorporates both breadth 
(extending some moral concern to more types of entities) and depth (the level of moral 
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concern extended to each entity). Maximal moral expansiveness is demonstrated by granting 
the highest moral concern to all types of entities. 
Further, we argue there is an intuitive link between expanding moral boundaries and a 
willingness to make personal sacrifices for those granted moral inclusion. The potential costs 
of moral inclusion, such as the use of time, money or other resources to benefit the welfare of 
others, have often been noted (Opotow, 2011; Pinker, 2011; Singer, 1981). Acknowledging 
that another entity is worthy of moral standing is more meaningful when it involves a 
commitment to defending or enacting those moral rights. Therefore, we argue that moral 
expansiveness is a unique construct that captures the extent of a person’s moral world in a 
way that also recognizes varying levels of moral concern. Other approaches to moral concern 
have not directly assessed moral standing, or have focused on broad sets of entities (e.g., all 
humanity). By focusing on how moral concern is applied across an extensive range of 
entities, moral expansiveness can provide new insights into moral psychology. Below we 
compare moral expansiveness with prominent existing constructs in moral psychology. 
Moral foundations theory (MFT; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) focuses on the basic 
foundations people rely on to make moral judgments, such as perceptions of care/harm or 
sanctity/degradation, rather than who is an appropriate entity for moral consideration. Some 
moral foundations, particularly ingroup/loyalty, suggest the extension of moral concern is 
restricted (to the ingroup). Thus, moral foundations might indirectly predict moral 
expansiveness, and perhaps especially the tendency to limit moral concern, but it does not 
claim to be a measure of moral expansiveness. 
Moral expansiveness is also different from moral identity; a self-conception organized 
around the degree to which a set of desirable moral traits (e.g., caring, compassionate, 
honest) are personally valued (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Hence, moral identity does not directly 
capture the extent, or the targets, of moral concern. For example, a person can perceive 
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themselves as holding moral values and being a moral person whether they apply moral 
concern to many things, or to just a few. While moral expansiveness has a different focus to 
moral identity, they may be linked empirically if having more expansive moral concern 
provides a basis for a stronger moral identity.  
Theories of values have identified that some values are typically described as “moral” 
(Schwartz, 2007). For example, universalism values (e.g., protecting the environment, 
equality, a world at peace) reflect an understanding, tolerance, and concern for the well-being 
of all people and for nature. Although these values reflect moral concern, they are very 
general (e.g., a world at peace) and do not empirically capture the extent to which moral 
standing is afforded to a range of targets. The current research can help us understand how 
moral values and moral expansiveness are linked.  
Finally, a recent line of work by Gray and colleagues has established the vital role of 
mind perception in moral decision making (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Gray & Schein, 
2012; Gray & Wegner, 2011; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). Specifically, this research has 
emphasized the dyadic nature of morality – that moral decision making involves perceptions 
of moral agents (entities possessing moral responsibility) and moral patients (entities 
deserving of moral rights). Relevant to the proposed work, research has determined that 
perceptions of the capacity for sensation and feelings – moral patiency – predict attributions 
of moral standing. However, while measures of patiency/experience have not previously been 
applied to capture generalized concern for others, the current research can determine if the 
tendency to extend moral concern to a greater number of entities corresponds with 
perceptions of the capacity for experience. By directly capturing the breadth of a person’s 
moral world and the relative moral weight attached to entities that reside within it, the 
concept of moral expansiveness has the potential to provide important and novel insights into 
each of these related moral constructs.   
7 
Moral Expansiveness  
Measuring Moral Expansiveness 
 As discussed above, our approach to measuring moral expansiveness incorporates 
three important elements: (i) a graded approach to moral concern, (ii) a broad range of 
entities, and (iii) the consideration of personal costs when granting moral inclusion. The 
graded approach to our measure captures the reality that people do not make judgments about 
moral concern in an all-or-nothing way, but have levels of concern varying from strong to 
none (Opotow, 2011; Pizarro et al., 2006). This approach differs from earlier measures that 
have involved dichotomous judgments, such as circling entities that are included in the 
“moral circle” or crossing out those that are excluded (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & 
Hodson, 2012a; Laham, 2009). Such explicit choices of who is included-excluded as moral 
entities offers a critical insight into the boundaries of moral concern, but should be 
supplemented with recognition of the varying strength of moral concern people display (e.g., 
strong moral obligations vs. some acknowledgement of moral rights). Thus, we used a graded 
approach to measure moral expansiveness that incorporates both the boundary of 
inclusion/exclusion and different levels of moral concern. 
Second, previous ‘moral circle' measures have targeted subsets of entities (e.g., 
'fringes of life' and animals; Bastian et al., 2012a; Laham, 2009; Opotow, 1993). Related 
constructs such as identification with all humanity (McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012) and 
connectedness to nature (Mayer & Frantz, 2004) focus on a restricted set of entities. Moving 
forward, instead of focusing on specific groups, the complex nature of the moral landscape 
must be reflected with a representative spread of entities (e.g., incorporating various human 
targets, animals, and the environment).  
Third, as highlighted by (Opotow, 2011), an appropriate measure should incorporate a 
willingness to make personal sacrifices, reflecting a realistic pursuit of moral inclusion. 
Moral inclusion does not just involve cognitive judgments about moral standing, but should 
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also have personal and behavioral consequences. Both Singer (1981) and Pinker (2011) 
argued that expanding moral concern involves detaching ourselves from our own narrow 
perspectives and self-interest: a move that can entail some level of personal cost and self-
sacrifice. If an entity is granted moral inclusion, then on some level it is acknowledged as 
worthy to share in valuable (and often limited) resources. Thus, moral expansiveness goes 
beyond abstract moral judgments relating to moral standing, and involves moral obligations 
and commitments to actively protect the moral rights of others, even at personal cost. 
The Moral Expansiveness Scale 
Because existing constructs do not meet all the criteria we believe are necessary to 
capture moral expansiveness, we constructed the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES). In the 
MES, participants indicate the relative moral standing of a wide range of entities by placing 
them within four defined boundaries: inner circle (entities worthy of the “highest level of 
moral concern and standing … you have a moral obligation to ensure their welfare and feel a 
sense of personal responsibility for their treatment”), an outer circle (“these entities deserve 
moderate moral concern and consideration…you are still concerned about their moral 
treatment; however, your sense of obligation and personal responsibility is greatly reduced”), 
fringes of moral concern (“these entities deserve minimal moral concern and standing, but 
you are not morally obliged or personally responsible for their treatment”), and outside the 
moral boundary (“these entities deserve no moral concern or standing… feeling concern or 
personal responsibility for their moral treatment is extreme or nonsensical”). The four 
boundaries of morality are graded (inner circle = 3, outer circle = 2, fringes = 1, outside = 0), 
and an aggregate score is calculated to reflect the expansiveness of an individual’s moral 
world.  
Using this measurement approach, the overall MES score summarizes the “breadth” 
and the “depth” of a person’s moral world. Further, the potential cosequences of moral 
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expansion are incorporated within this graded boundary approach, as it directs people to 
consider the personal costs of moral inclusion. In order to provide an extensive map for how 
people structure their moral worlds, 30 entities were included spanning 10 categories: ‘family 
& friends’, ‘ingroup’, ‘outgroup’, ‘revered people’, ‘stigmatized’, ‘villains’, ‘high sentience 
animals’, ‘low sentience animals’, ‘plants’, and ‘environment’. Three entities were included 
in each of these categories (see Appendices A and B for the complete scale1).  
Overview of Studies 
The current research comprises six studies that establish the validity of the MES and 
its contribution as a unique predictor of moral decision making. Study 1 establishes the 
reliability of the MES, describes normative beliefs about which entities are central versus 
distal in terms of moral concern, and examines the relationships between moral 
expansiveness and demographic variables. Study 2 examines the convergent and predictive 
validity of the MES compared to established “moral” constructs. Study 3 examines the 
unique role of moral expansiveness – relative to “moral” and “generalized” constructs linked 
with moral concern – in predicting intentions when individuals are faced with an extremely 
costly ultimatum: to sacrifice one’s life to protect others. Studies 4 and 5 apply the self-
sacrifice criterion to determine the predictive utility of moral expansiveness against 
alternative measures of moral standing (experience and warmth), and to establish that 
expansiveness cannot be reduced to a general sense of personal responsibility. Finally, Study 
6 demonstrates that the MES predicts behavior at a personal cost over and above a range of 
existing constructs. The sample size for all studies met the recommendations for hierarchical 
regression in relation to cases per IV according to (Brace, Kemp, & Snelgar, 2009; i.e., at 
least 5 cases per variable). 
Study 1 – Reliability and Structure of the MES 
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Study 1 had three functions: (1) to test the reliability of the MES, (2) to map 
normative patterns of the extent to which entities are central versus distal in people’s moral 
worlds, and (3) to explore how moral expansiveness varies as a function of demographic 
characteristics (age, political conservatism, religiosity, and gender). Strong relationships 
between demographic variables and the MES were not expected. However, because political 
conservatism is associated with less moral regard towards outgroup members (Bassett, 2010; 
Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009) and less engagement in environmentalism (Neumayer, 2004), 
we expected that there would be a negative association between moral expansiveness and 
political conservatism. 
Method 
Participants and Measures. One-hundred and twenty-six U.S. participants (52.38% 
Male, Mage = 34.59, SD = 11.89) were sourced through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
Participants were first introduced to the concept of ‘moral circles’ and then completed the 
MES2, followed by demographic questions. These included two single-item measures of 
political conservatism: economic conservatism (“please indicate your political beliefs from 
left/liberal to right/conservative on issues of the economy, e.g., social welfare, government 
spending, tax cuts”; 1 – left/liberal to 7 – right/conservative), and social conservatism 
(“please indicate your political beliefs from left/liberal to right/conservative on social issues, 
e.g., immigration, homosexual marriage, abortion”; 1 – left/liberal to 7 – right/conservative). 
Also included was a four-item religiosity scale (e.g., “how religious are you?”; 1 – not at all 
religious to 7 – very religious; α = .92; Cohen, Malka, Rozin, & Cherfas, 2006).  
Results and Discussion 
Nine participants (7.14%) were excluded on the basis of failed attention checks and 
not engaging with the task appropriately3, leaving 117 participants. Each participant’s MES 
score was calculated based on the placement of the target entities within the graded 
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boundaries of concern (inner circle = 3, outer circle = 2, fringes = 1, outside = 0). Hence, the 
aggregate MES score across the 30 entities could vary from 0 to 90, with higher scores 
indicating greater moral expansiveness. The means, standard deviations and correlations 
between the total MES and entity groups are displayed in Table 1. The 30 items formed an 
MES scale with strong internal consistency (α = .92) with a mean of 44.21 (SD = 12.30) and 
a range of 67. 
The mean MES scores of the entity groups were plotted in order to illustrate the 
normative structure of the moral world (Figure 1). Family and friends (ratings in this category 
had very low variance) were consensually deemed to be worthy of the highest moral concern, 
followed by the ingroup (α = .67), revered individuals (α = .61), stigmatized individuals (α = 
.80), and the outgroup (α = .80). High-sentience animals (α = .89) held the highest moral 
standing of non-human groups, followed by environmental targets (α = .92), low-sentience 
animals (α = .86), and plants (α = .87). Villains (α = .92) appeared on the outer edges of the 
moral world and held the lowest moral standing of all targets.  
There were no significant relationships between the MES and demographic variables: 
age (r = -.09, p = .35), conservatism – economic (r = -.18, p = .06), conservatism – social (r = 
-.04, p = .29), or religiosity (r = .09, p = .34). There were also no differences in MES scores 
between males (M = 44.00, SD = 12.77) and females (M = 44.44, SD = 11.85), t(115) = -.19, 
p = .85, 95% CI [-4.97, 4.09].  
The findings from Study 1 provide support for the reliability of the MES. Further, 
these data revealed a normative structure of the moral world. Generally, human targets are 
worthy of the greatest moral concern and consideration (unless they have committed an act to 
lose this, i.e., ‘villains’). However, non-human targets (including animals, plants and the 
environment) still consistently hold some moral standing. The MES produced no strong 
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associations with key demographic variables, indicating that moral expansiveness is not 
reducible to general political attitudes or religious beliefs.  
Study 2 – Comparing Moral Expansiveness to Other Moral Constructs 
Study 2 explored the unique convergent and predictive validity of moral 
expansiveness compared to other constructs that focus on moral judgments and moral values: 
moral foundations (Haidt & Joseph, 2004); moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002); and moral 
(universalism) values (Schwartz, 2007). As described above, we expect moral expansiveness 
assesses a unique aspect of moral cognition and will predict moral decision making after 
controlling for these established morality constructs.  
It is also important to establish convergent validity of the MES. It is expected that 
there will be some overlap between moral expansiveness and the other moral constructs 
because they all form a part of people’s moral judgments. For example, placing greater 
emphasis on basic concerns for the suffering of others (care/harm of MFT), and concerns 
relating to unfair treatment and inequality (fairness/cheating), may be associated with more 
expansive moral boundaries. Therefore, positive correlations between the MES and 
endorsement of the ‘harm’ and ‘fairness’ foundations were expected. Conversely, the 
“binding foundations” of ‘ingroup’, ‘authority’ and ‘purity’ foundations are associated with 
group loyalty, endorsement of traditional social hierarchies, and marking a group’s cultural 
boundaries, respectively (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Therefore, endorsement of these 
‘binding foundations’ suggests a greater focus on ingroup considerations at the expense of 
more disadvantaged or ‘distant’ humans, as well as animals and the environment. 
Consequently, negative relationships between MES and these foundations were expected.  
Previous research has identified a relationship between moral identity and increased 
moral regard toward outgroup members (Reed & Aquino, 2003). Moreover, endorsement of 
universalism values such as equality and protecting the environment have been associated 
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with greater moral inclusivity (Schwartz, 2007). Therefore, positive associations between 
moral identity, universalism values, and the MES were predicted. 
In terms of predictive utility, moral expansiveness should be particularly powerful in 
predicting moral decision making and behavioral intentions in contexts where protecting the 
rights and needs of others incurs some cost. One way to assess this is to create a context in 
which this tendency might emerge, such as pitting ingroup concerns against outgroup 
concerns. This is similar to the approach taken by (McFarland & Mathews, 2005), in which 
participants judged the relative importance of national self-interest goals vs. broader human 
rights goals (e.g., maintaining a strong national military vs. ending child prostitution 
worldwide). We developed a similar measure that included not just concern for human 
outgroups, but also extended to non-human animals and the environment. It was hypothesized 
that moral expansiveness would predict willingness to support altruistic human and non-
human concerns against ingroup concerns, over and above established morality measures.  
Method 
Participants and Measures. One-hundred and twenty-three U.S. participants 
(64.23% male, Mage = 34.01, SD = 11.57) were sourced through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
Participants completed the MES, the three established morality constructs, and criterion 
measures described below.   
Morality Measures. 
Moral Foundations. The short version of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
(MFQ20; Graham et al., 2009) assessed five moral foundations: care/harm (α = .77), 
fairness/cheating (α = .65), ingroup/loyalty (α = .69), authority/subversion (α = .75), and 
purity/degradation (α = .87). Within this scale, some items ask participants to consider the 
relevance of a number of factors in deciding whether something is right or wrong (e.g., 
“whether or not someone suffered emotionally”; 0 – not at all relevant to 5 – extremely 
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relevant), and other items ask participants to indicate their level of agreement with a range of 
morally relevant statements (e.g., “compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial 
virtue”; 0 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree).  
Moral Identity. The 10-item Self-Importance of Moral Identity scale (Aquino & Reed, 
2002) captures the extent to which a range of moral characteristics (e.g., caring, 
compassionate, fair) are personally valued. The scale comprises two dimensions: 
internalization (e.g., “it would make me feel good to be a person who has these 
characteristics”; α = .79), and symbolization (e.g., “I am actively involved in activities that 
communicate to others that I have these characteristics”; α = .88). All items used a 5-point 
scale (1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree).  
Universalism. Six universalism values (e.g., broadmindedness, equality) were 
selected from Schwartz (1992). These were rated as guiding principles in one’s life (1 – not 
at all important to 5 – extremely important; α = .83).  
Criterion Measures.  
The criterion measures captured willingness to engage in ingroup or personal sacrifice 
for both human and non-human targets in situations such as policy making, donations, and 
charitable giving.  
Human and Non-Human Concern Judgments.  We adapted and extended McFarland 
et al.’s (2012) Human Rights Choices Questionnaire, which requires participants to make 
choices about who should have priority in rights and welfare dilemmas. These items 
examined concern for humans (e.g., “a – making medicines available overseas for those who 
cannot afford them” vs. “b – making sure America has the best hospitals in the world”; 1 – 
item a is much more important to 5 – item b is much more important); concern for non-
human animals (e.g., “a –protecting the habitats of chimpanzees and the other great apes 
around the world”, vs. “b – ensuring the cost of living remains stable in America”); and 
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concern for the environment (e.g., “a – protecting the world’s remaining old-growth forests” 
vs. “b – preventing another U.S. recession”). Participants were required to choose the relative 
importance of these nationalistic and self-interested concerns against concerns for more 
distant targets, both human and non-human (8 items; α = .81).  
Kidney Donation. This personal sacrifice measure was designed to capture concern 
for human targets at a personal cost. It required participants to imagine an organ shortage at a 
local hospital and to indicate how likely they would be to donate one of their kidneys to a 
range of seven targets (e.g., charity worker, refugee, convicted murderer) on a 7-point scale 
(1 – very unlikely, 7 – very likely; α = .92).  
Financial Donation. Because kidney donation is restricted to human targets, a second 
measure assessing financial donation was created for non-human animals and the 
environment. This measure required participants to imagine they had recently inherited a 
large sum of money. Participants were then asked how likely they would be to donate a 
portion of it to a range of six charities (e.g., saving chimpanzee habitats, restore blue-fin tuna 
populations, saving endangered plant species; 1 – very unlikely, 7 – very likely; α = .93).  
Results and Discussion 
Using the same exclusion criteria as Study 1, four participants (3.25%) were 
excluded, leaving 119 participants for analysis. The mean MES score was 54.13 (SD = 
13.00) with a range of 65. 
Convergent Validity. Table 2 shows that the MES shared weak to moderate 
correlations with other morality constructs (rs < .37), indicating that it shares meaningful 
variance with other approaches to assessing morality, but not to the point of redundancy. 
Scores on the MES were significantly correlated with four of the five moral foundations. As 
predicted, those high in moral expansiveness were more likely to base their moral judgments 
on considerations of the wellbeing of others and protecting them from harm (care/harm). 
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Conversely, the MES was moderately negatively correlated with ‘binding’ foundations: 
ingroup, authority, and purity. As predicted, those high in moral expansiveness reported 
greater endorsement of universalism values. However, expansive moral concern was not 
related to moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002), both when it was operationalized as the 
extent to which desirable moral traits are central to an individual’s self-concept 
(internalization), and the extent to which people engaged in public expressions of these traits 
(symbolization).   
Predictive Validity. Correlations among the criterion measures and predictors can 
also be found in Table 2. As predicted, the MES showed strong and statistically significant 
correlations with all four criterion judgments.  Universalism values and the 
authority/subversion, ingroup/loyalty, and purity/degradation moral foundations subscales 
were significantly associated with 2 of the 4 criterion variables, whereas the other moral 
constructs correlated with just one of the criterion variables.  
A set of hierarchical regressions was performed to determine whether moral 
expansiveness could account for unique variance in moral decision making over and above 
established measures. Demographic variables4 (age, gender, and religiosity) were entered at 
Step 1, the moral foundations dimensions, moral identity, and universalism values were 
entered at Step 2, and the MES entered at Step 3. Collinearity diagnostics indicated no 
problematic multi-collinearity (all VIFs < 3.6). Results for the human and non-human 
concern criterion measures are shown in Table 3; results for kidney and financial donation 
measures are shown in Table 4. As can be seen, moral expansiveness accounted for unique 
variance over these established measures when predicting (1) prioritizing global humanitarian 
concerns over ingroup concerns; (2) prioritizing animal and environmental concerns over 
ingroup concerns; (3) a willingness to donate one’s kidneys to a range of non-kin targets, and 
(4) financial donations to animal welfare and environmental causes. These findings, as well 
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as the weak to moderate correlations between the MES and the other predictors, suggests that 
moral expansiveness is capturing a distinct element of moral cognition, which can make a 
unique contribution to our understanding of moral judgments and their consequences.  
Study 3 – Willingness to Self-Sacrifice and Moral Expansiveness 
 In Study 3 we tested the limits of the relationship between moral expansiveness and 
the willingness to sacrifice by examining whether moral expansiveness has a unique role in 
predicting behavioral intentions when individuals are faced with an extremely costly 
ultimatum: to sacrifice one’s life to protect others. Extrapolating from Study 2, we predicted 
that those with more expansive moral boundaries should be more willing to sacrifice 
themselves to save the lives of a range of human and non-human entities. Further, as in Study 
2, we expected that this relationship would hold after controlling for the morality constructs 
previously established in the literature. 
  In Study 3, we aimed to further establish the convergent and predictive validity of the 
MES against measures not explicitly invoking morality, but that have been linked to moral 
concern. Previous research has established that dispositional empathy has been related to 
altruistic tendencies (Eisenberg, 2010; Paciello, Fida, Cerniglia, Tramontano, & Cole, 2013; 
Pizarro et al., 2006), and at least conceptually linked to the notion of expansive moral 
concern (Pinker, 2011; Singer, 1981).Other relevant theories focus on specific entities, such 
as humanity as a whole (identification with all humanity; McFarland et al., 2012) or nature 
(connectedness to nature; Mayer & Frantz, 2004), which may be related to the extent of 
moral concern afforded to particular targets. Therefore, while not explicitly evoking morality, 
it is important to empirically demonstrate that moral expansiveness makes a unique practical 
contribution over and above these constructs. Further, because these constructs are all 
associated with the extension of concern, it is informative to understand whether they are 
related to moral expansiveness.  
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Consistent with Study 2, moral expansiveness should be associated with a willingness 
to extend moral concern to both human and non-human targets. It was therefore anticipated 
that greater moral expansiveness would be associated with a tendency to identify with all 
humanity (McFarland et al., 2012) and with perceived connection to the natural world (Mayer 
& Frantz, 2004). Moral expansiveness should also be associated with empathic traits, 
specifically increased empathic concern and perspective taking (Davis, 1983; Pizarro et al., 
2006). However, it is expected that the MES will make a unique contribution over and above 
these constructs in predicting a willingness to protect the rights and needs of others.   
Finally, given the nature of the criterion judgments, we included five control 
variables. These included three demographic control variables used in Study 2 – age, gender 
and religiosity – and two additional control variables: belief in the afterlife and social 
desirability. We surmised that people who believe in life after death might be more willing to 
sacrifice their lives as it would be seen as less costly, and even potentially rewarding. The 
need to control for a tendency to provide socially desirable responses was expected given the 
potentially discomforting nature of the judgments.  
Method 
Participants and Measures. Three-hundred and sixteen U.S. participants (58.20% 
female, Mage = 36.16, SD = 12.35) were sourced through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. They 
completed an online questionnaire that included the MES, the willingness to self-sacrifice 
measure (described below), the “morality” constructs from Study 2 (moral foundations, the 
two dimensions of moral identity, and universalism values), and a set of ‘generalized 
concern’ scales described below.  
Additional Controls. As introduced above, measures of belief in the afterlife and 
social desirability were included as additional controls. A 3-item version Belief in Afterlife 
Scale (Osarchuk & Tatz, 1973) was used in order to control for perceptions of a life after 
19 
Moral Expansiveness  
death (e.g., “There is no such thing as a life after death”; 1 – strongly disagree to 7 – strongly 
agree; α = .95 . To account for the tendency to provide overtly desirable responses, an 11-
item version (Reynolds, 1982) of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960) was used (e.g., "I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake"; 1 - 
true, 2 - false; α = .80).  
Generalized Concern Measures. 
Empathy. To assess empathy, the empathic concern (7 items, α = .90) and perspective 
taking (7 items, α = .90) sub-scales were included from Davis’s (1983) Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index. These scales measure how well a set of empathic traits describes the 
individual on a 5-point scale (e.g., “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less 
fortunate than me”; 1 – does not describe me well to 5 – describes me very well).  
Connectedness to Nature. Mayer and Frantz’s (2004) Connectedness to Nature Scale 
(CNS; α = .90) comprises 14 items assessing trait levels of feeling emotionally connected to 
the natural world. An example item is “I often feel a sense of oneness with the natural world 
around me” (1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree).  
Identification with All Humanity. The Identification with All Humanity Scale (IWAH, 
McFarland et al., 2012) consists of 9 items that capture feelings of identification and concern 
towards 3 groups of people: “the local community”, “Americans”, and “all humans 
everywhere” (α = .89). An example item is “How much do you identify with (feel a part of, 
feel love toward, have concern for) each of the following?”; 1 – not at all close to 5 – very 
close.  
Criterion Measure. 
Willingness to self-sacrifice. To assess willingness to self-sacrifice, participants were 
presented with the following scenario: 
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Imagine your powerful country is ruled by a ruthless dictator. This dictator has 
ultimate power and is notorious for taking violent action for unknown reasons, 
though he is always true to his word. This dictator has recently passed a set of 
laws that has put a range of specific groups and entities at risk of being 
completely wiped out, and unfortunately, all other world leaders are too afraid 
to intervene. He has ordered that action against these groups will begin 
immediately, however he has also decided that if somebody from his own 
country volunteers to sacrifice themselves instead, the groups will be saved. 
 
Eight entities were presented in random order: ‘people from your hometown’, ‘people 
from the African continent’, people with an intellectual disability from your country’, ‘people 
currently incarcerated in your country’, ‘chimpanzees’, ‘ants’, ‘redwood trees’, and ‘coral 
reefs’. These entities were selected (four human and four non-human) as targets that ranged 
from the centre to the peripheries of most people’s moral spheres. Participants were asked to 
consider how many of a particular entity would need to be killed by the dictator for them to 
sacrifice themselves in their place (e.g., 1 = ‘1-10’, 2 = ’10-100’, 3 = ‘100-1000’, 4 = ‘10%’, 
5 = ‘25%’, 6 = ‘50%’, 7 = ‘75%’, 8 = ‘90%’, 9 = ‘100%’, to 10 = ‘I would never sacrifice 
myself’). Each entity was presented individually with the following assumptions made clear: 
(1) there are no other options and nobody else is going to volunteer, (2) your death would be 
painless, and (3) sacrificing your life would definitely save the lives of the targets. These 
targets were analysed both as individual items and as an overall construct capturing overall 
willingness to self-sacrifice (α = .87). 
Results and Discussion 
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Applying the same exclusion criteria as in the previous studies to both the MES and 
self-sacrifice measure, 27 participants (8.54%) were excluded leaving a sample of 2895. The 
mean MES score was 44.92 (SD = 13.12) with a range of 71. 
Convergent Validity.  
Correlations between the MES and the ‘generalized concern’ predictors included in 
Study 3 are presented in Table 5. As predicted, higher scores on the MES were associated 
with significantly greater empathic concern and perspective taking. Similarly, higher scores 
on the MES were positively associated with identification with all humanity and 
connectedness to nature, indicating that the MES spans both human and non-human domains. 
As with Study 2, these correlations (rs < .40) indicate there is some overlap between these 
constructs and moral expansiveness, but not to the point of redundancy. 
Predictive Validity. 
Correlations between all predictor scales and willingness to self-sacrifice – both 
overall and for each entity – are also found in Table 5. As predicted, there was a significant 
positive relationship between scores on the MES and overall willingness to self-sacrifice. 
Across the individual entities, holding more expansive moral boundaries was associated with 
an increased willingness to self-sacrifice (in one case marginally significant) for all of the 
eight targets. Further, the MES produced a far more consistent pattern across the entities 
(both human and non-human) than any other predictor. Of note, the care/harm dimension of 
moral foundations, empathic concern, perspective taking, identification with all humanity, 
and the internalization component of moral identity each produced significant correlations 
across the human targets. For non-human targets, connectedness to nature and universalism 
values each produced some positive correlations, whereas the authority/subversion and 
purity/degradation dimensions of moral foundations were associated with a reluctance to 
self-sacrifice.  
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A single hierarchical regression was performed, collapsing across the targets in order 
to predict overall willingness to self-sacrifice. This regression consisted of four steps: the 
demographic and control variables (age, gender, religiosity, belief in the afterlife, and social 
desirability) at Step 1, morality predictors at Step 2, ‘generalized concern’ predictors at Step 
3, and MES at Step 4 (see Table 6). Collinearity diagnostics indicated no problematic multi-
collinearity (all VIFs < 3.0). As can be seen, over and above the demographic and control 
variables, the internalization subscale of moral identity was the only traditional morality 
construct to significantly predict willingness to self-sacrifice at Step 2. When the ‘generalized 
concern’ predictors were included at Step 3, identification with all humanity and 
connectedness to nature became the only significant predictors. However, entering the MES 
at Step 4 explained a significant amount of extra variance over and above these seventeen 
predictors, with higher moral expansiveness associated with an increased overall willingness 
to self-sacrifice across the targets,  = .16, p = .015, 95% CI [0.03, 0.29].   
 In sum, Study 3 provides strong additional evidence for the relationship between 
moral expansiveness and a willingness to overcome self-interest in the extension of moral 
concern. These results move beyond the findings of Study 2 (e.g., ingroup vs. outgroup 
policy decisions), because moral expansiveness was found to be a powerful predictor of a 
willingness to protect others while making the ultimate sacrifice – one’s life. Further, the 
MES made a unique contribution not just over established “morality” predictors, but also 
over and above a set of ‘generalized concern’ constructs that have been empirically linked to 
moral concern.  Of all these relevant constructs, the MES produced the most consistent 
correlations across the self-sacrifice target entities. While certain constructs (e.g., 
identification with all humanity, connectedness to nature) were associated with a willingness 
to sacrifice one’s life for other human or non-human entities, the MES was the only construct 
to consistently predict variance across both human and non-human targets. Further, moral 
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expansiveness was a unique predictor of the overall willingness to self-sacrifice even after the 
explanatory contribution of these constructs had been accounted for.  
Study 4 – Moral Expansiveness and Moral Patiency 
In Study 4, we tested the relationship between moral expansiveness and an established 
predictor of moral rights attribution, moral patiency. Unlike previous morality constructs 
examined in Studies 2 and 3, the extent to which individual entities are perceived to hold 
moral patiency (e.g., the capacity to experience suffering) has been directly linked with their 
deservingness of moral rights (Gray et al., 2007). The mind survey (Gray et al., 2007) split 
perceptions of minds along two independent dimensions: agency and experience. Perceptions 
of agency (self-control, judgment, communication, thought, and memory) predict attributions 
of moral responsibility, and perceptions of experience (hunger, fear, pain, pleasure and 
consciousness) predict attributions of moral rights. Therefore, given the central role of the 
experience dimension in predicting perceptions of moral rights, we sought to further examine 
the convergent and predictive validity of moral expansiveness against this construct. Overall, 
we predicted a moderate to strong relationship between holding more expansive moral 
boundaries and perceptions of entity experience.   
Method 
Participants and Measures. 
Ninety-six U.S. participants (51.00% female, Mage = 36.06, SD = 11.91) were sourced 
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. They completed an online questionnaire that included 
the MES, the willingness to self-sacrifice measure and controls (social desirability and belief 
in the afterlife) from Study 3. In addition to these measures, perceived experience was 
captured based on ratings of two metal capacities (Gray et al., 2007). Participants rated each 
of the 30 entities contained in the MES individually on their ability to feel fear (e.g., “How 
capable of feeling fear are the following targets?”; 0 – not at all, to 6 – very much) and pain 
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(e.g., “How capable of feeling pain are the following targets?”). The mean fear and pain 
ratings across all targets were then averaged to create an overall experience scale (α = .81).  
Results and Discussion 
Applying the existing exclusion criteria, 5 participants (5.21%) were excluded leaving 
a sample of 91 for analysis. The mean MES score was 44.12 (SD = 14.41) with a range of 69. 
Convergent Validity.  
As predicted, greater moral expansiveness was associated with increased perceptions 
of entities’ capacity for experience (averaging across entities; r = .30, p = .004). Consistent 
with previous studies, these data indicate some overlap between experience and moral 
expansiveness, but not to the point of redundancy. 
Predictive Validity. 
Consistent with Study 3, the MES was significantly associated with overall 
willingness to self-sacrifice (r = .27, p = .011). However, the association between willingness 
to self-sacrifice and perceptions of experience was non-significant (r = .06, p = .58). As with 
previous studies, a hierarchical regression was performed to predict an overall willingness to 
self-sacrifice. The demographic and control variables were entered at Step 1 (age, gender, 
religiosity, belief in the afterlife, and social desirability), experience at Step 2, and the MES 
at Step 3. Collinearity diagnostics indicated no multi-collinearity concerns (all VIFs < 2.3). 
As can be seen in Table 7, the control variables at Step 1 and experience at Step 2 did not 
account for unique variance in willingness to self-sacrifice. However, the MES at Step 3 was 
again a significant predictor, with higher moral expansiveness associated with an increased 
willingness to self-sacrifice,  = .24, p = .019, 95% CI [0.02, 0.47]. The results of Study 4 
provide additional evidence for the convergent validity and unique predictive contribution of 
the MES, this time against an established determinant of moral rights. Consistent with Study 
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3, moral expansiveness was again a unique predictor of moral decision making via the 
willingness to protect others from harm at personal cost.  
Study 5 – Moral Expansiveness, Warmth and Personal Responsibility 
 In Study 5 we examined the MES against another established measure of moral rights 
– warmth. The stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) proposes two 
primary dimensions along which outgroup members (e.g., gender, ethnicity) are judged: 
warmth and competence. The position of social groups along these dimensions can predict 
perceptions of status and associated prejudice. For example, those perceived as high in 
competence but low in warmth may be high in status but viewed as cold and inhuman (e.g., 
rich people). In contrast, those low in competence but high in warmth can be perceived as 
low status but sweet and harmless (e.g., housewives). Importantly, perceptions of warmth can 
predict the moral standing of individuals and social groups (Fiske et al., 2002). Therefore, to 
further highlight the contribution of moral expansiveness we examined the predictive power 
of the MES against perceptions of target warmth. 
 We also aimed to show that the predictive power of moral expansiveness could not 
simply be reduced to a general sense of personal/social responsibility (Penner, 2002; Penner, 
Fritzsche, Craiger, & Freifeld, 1995). We have shown that moral expansiveness predicts 
willingness to assume personal responsibility through willingness to sacrifice for others. 
However, it is important to show that this reflects more than just being willing to take on 
responsibility in any situation. Thus, we examined whether the predictive validity of the MES 
went beyond a general sense of personal/social responsibility. 
Method 
Participants and Measures. 
Ninety-seven U.S. participants (53.60% male, Mage = 35.65, SD = 12.57) were 
sourced through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. They completed an online questionnaire that 
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included the MES, the willingness to self-sacrifice scale (Study 3), and control measures 
(social desirability and belief in the afterlife). Applying the Fiske et al. (2002) approach 
participants then rated the 30 MES entities on perceptions of warmth (“as viewed by society, 
how warm – i.e., sincere, friendly – are the following targets?”; 1 – not at all to 5 – very 
much; α = .92). In addition, participants completed the 7-item social responsibility subscale 
of the prosocial personality battery (Penner, 2002; e.g., “no matter what a person has done to 
us, there is no excuse for taking advantage of them”; 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly 
agree; α = .67). 
Results and Discussion 
Applying the existing exclusion criteria, ten participants (10.31%) were excluded 
leaving a sample of 87 for analysis. The mean MES score was 46.40 (SD = 13.48) with a 
range of 77. 
Convergent Validity.  
As expected, holding more expansive moral boundaries was associated with 
significantly greater perceptions of warmth across the 30 target entities (averaging across 
entities; r = .33, p = .002). The MES held a positive but non-significant relationship with trait 
levels of social responsibility (r = .16, p = .13). Again, these relationships do not indicate 
redundancy between moral expansiveness and existing measures.  
Predictive Validity. 
Consistent with previous studies, the MES was significantly related to overall 
willingness to self-sacrifice (r = .23, p = .03), whereas perceptions of warmth (r = .16, p = 
.14) and social responsibility (r = .11, p = .32) produced positive yet non-significant trends. 
In examining the predictive relationships, a hierarchical regression was performed on overall 
willingness to self-sacrifice. Control variables were again entered at Step 1 (age, gender, 
religiosity, belief in the afterlife, and social desirability), perceptions of warmth and social 
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responsibility at Step 2, and the MES at Step 3 (see Table 8). Collinearity diagnostics 
indicated no multi-collinearity concerns (all VIFs < 2.9). Following the control variables at 
Step 1, perceptions of warmth did not make a unique contribution, and social responsibility 
was marginally significant. However, the MES entered at Step 3 was again a significant 
predictor of willingness to sacrifice,  = .23, p = .047, 95% CI [0.003, 0.453]. These results 
lend further support to the unique contribution of moral expansiveness. The MES is able to 
predict moral decision making over and above an established proxy of moral standing, and 
the contribution of moral expansiveness cannot be explained by a general sense of 
personal/social responsibility.  
Study 6 – Moral Expansiveness and Behavior  
 In Studies 2-5 the utility of the MES in predicting moral decision making has been 
demonstrated across various pro-social and sacrificial scenarios spanning both the human and 
non-human domains. In Study 6 we examined the power of moral expansiveness in predicting 
actual behavior – sacrificing one’s time in aid of a cause. As we have highlighted, there is an 
intuitive link between expanding moral boundaries and a willingness to make personal 
sacrifices for those perceived as holding moral standing. Further, others have argued the 
moral inclusion of entities often involves potential resource costs (e.g., time; Opotow, 2011; 
Pinker, 2011; Singer, 1981). Consequently, we predicted that those with more expansive 
moral boundaries will be more willing to donate their free time to defend the moral standing 
of a non-human entity.   
Method 
Participants and Measures. 
Ninety-nine (79.80% female, Mage = 19.66, SD = 3.00) first-year psychology students 
from a large Australian university completed the study in exchange for course credit. 
Participants arrived at the laboratory to complete a computer based questionnaire that 
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included the MES, demographics, and additional predictor measures. These additional 
measures were selected as the most effective predictors of moral decision making from 
Studies 2-5: the harm dimension of moral foundations, moral identity (internalization), 
universalism values, empathic concern, and connectedness to nature6. While participants 
were completing the survey, they were each handed a piece of paper which contained the 
following information:  
“Before you leave today I would like to give you the opportunity to join an important 
cause that has motivated the current research. The Non-human Rights Project (NhRP) 
is a civil rights organization working towards achieving actual legal rights for 
members of species other than our own (e.g., chimpanzees). A campaign in support of 
this initiative is currently underway, and I am going to provide you with an 
opportunity to take part upon completion of this survey” 
Following the completion of the survey participants were thanked for their 
involvement and then asked if they would like to view the NhRP campaign (yes/no). 
Participants that declined were then free to leave the lab following their debriefing. Those 
that decided to view the campaign were directed to a new page where they were asked to join 
a letter writing campaign in support of Tommy the chimpanzee (currently owned by a 
research institution) being granted legal personhood status – a case that was soon to be heard 
before the U.S. Supreme Court (ABC, 2015). Participants were instructed that the aim of the 
cause was to narrow the gulf between human beings and our closest living relatives, and 
specifically to grant Tommy the fundamental rights of bodily integrity and liberty. In 
addition, in order to emphasize the costs of endorsing the NhRP campaign, participants were 
informed of the potential for negative human consequences (e.g., disrupting animal-based 
farming practices, and drawing into question the legal rights of animals used for human 
consumption).   
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Following this information, participants were informed that if they wanted to join the 
campaign (those that did not were again free to leave) they could do so by writing their 
“opinions, endorsement, or general thoughts in support of the campaign” in a space provided, 
and that responses would be forwarded on to the NhRP. Participants received no additional 
credit for joining the letter writing campaign. Participants that joined the campaign as 
reported below, were those who provided a written response in support after confirming they 
would like to join (dummy coded; join campaign = 1, decline = 0).. 
Results and Discussion 
Nine participants (9.09%) were excluded from analysis based on the criteria used in 
earlier studies. One additional participant was excluded as the methodological protocol was 
not followed (i.e., participant was not provided with the handout containing information 
about the NhRP campaign) resulting in 89 participants for analysis. The mean MES score 
was 48.20 (SD = 11.55) with a range of 57.   
Predictive Validity.  
As predicted, there was a significantly positive relationship between moral 
expansiveness and willingness to join the letter writing campaign (rpb = .29, p = .007). A 
hierarchical logistic regression was performed predicting whether or not participants joining 
the campaign. Age, gender and religiosity were entered as demographic controls in Step 1; 
harm, moral identity (internalization), universalism values, empathic concern, and 
connectedness to nature at Step 2; and the MES at Step 3 (see Table 9). The control variables 
entered at Step 1 did not produce a significant overall model. When the established predictors 
were entered at Step 2 there was a significant increase in variance accounted for, however 
there were no significant predictors. As in previous studies, when the MES was entered at the 
final step it produced a significant change over and above the established predictors. 
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Specifically, every one unit increase in moral expansiveness increased the likelihood of 
joining the letter writing campaign by 6%, Exp(B) = 1.06, p = .041, 95% CI [1.00, 1.11].   
These findings provide an important empirical leap in terms of the predictive utility of 
moral expansiveness. Study 6 showed that the extent to which people are expansive in their 
moral concern can predict actual behavioral responses relating to moral decision making and 
concern for the well-being of other entities. Specifically, over and above the strongest 
predictors of moral decision making from Studies 2-5, moral expansiveness was the only 
unique predictor of whether or not individuals were willing to sacrifice their time to join a 
letter writing campaign to uphold the moral rights of other entities. These findings provide 
additional evidence for moral expansiveness as a unique factor in moral decision making, and 
as a construct tapping into a new dimension of moral cognition.  
General Discussion 
The current research demonstrates that moral expansiveness is an important element 
of moral cognition, and provides empirical support for the MES as a valid and reliable 
measure of the extent to which people extend their moral boundaries. Crucially, these 
findings show that variation in the tendency to extend moral boundaries is a key predictor of 
moral decision making and behavior across both human and non-human domains. The MES 
predicts willingness to prioritize humanitarian and environmental concerns over personal and 
national self-interest; willingness to donate a kidney to a range of non-kin human targets; and 
willingness to make a financial contribution to a range of animal and environmental causes 
(Study 2). Moral expansiveness also predicts willingness to sacrifice one’s life to protect 
human and non-human others, (e.g., ingroup and outgroup members, animals, and 
environmental entities; Studies 3-5). Lastly, the MES predicts willingness to sacrifice one’s 
time to support a campaign to protect the moral standing of non-human entities (Study 6). 
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Demonstrating the distinct contribution of moral expansiveness in predicting moral 
decision making, the MES explained unique variance in these tendencies and behaviors even 
after controlling for a range of established morality and related ‘generalized concern’ 
constructs. Collectively, these studies have shown that moral expansiveness, as measured by 
the MES, goes beyond a capacity for empathic concern and perspective taking, is more than 
extended identification and connection with others, and is different from moral intuitions, 
moral identity, moral patiency, endorsement of universalism values, or social/personal 
responsibility.  
Implications  
Overall, these findings provide further evidence that the depth and breadth of people’s 
moral boundaries hold important implications for decision making. Existing theories of moral 
decision making and action have focused on the role of emotion vs. rational deliberation 
(Batson, 1987; Haidt, 2001; Turiel, 1983), the divergent nature of our moral intuitions (Haidt, 
2012), the importance of morality in our self-conception (Aquino & Reed, 2002), and the 
dyadic nature of morality and mind perception (Gray & Wegner, 2011). Moral expansiveness 
shows that, in addition to these factors, the extent to which we are expansive in granting 
moral rights is uniquely influential.  
The current research draws attention to altruistic aspects of moral inclusivity. 
Although the self-sacrificing commitments of moral inclusion have been proposed (Opotow, 
2011; Pinker, 2011; Singer, 1981), the current research establishes a robust link between 
holding more expansive moral boundaries and a willingness to uphold the moral rights of 
others even when it comes at a cost to oneself and one’s ingroup. While it could be argued 
that reciprocity for such actions could still come in the form of enhanced reputation (i.e., 
indirect reciprocity and sexual selection; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Trivers, 1971), these 
mechanisms struggle to account for the occurrence of anonymous altruism, or the recent 
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documented shifts in the expansion of moral concern (Bloom, 2010; Pinker, 2011). 
Therefore, moral expansiveness may contribute to our understanding of altruism extending 
beyond predictable limits.  
Equally, these findings have substantial implications for real world pro-sociality, and 
global humanitarian and environmental issues (e.g., foreign aid at the expense of ingroup 
causes, or environmental protection at the expense of economic growth). Being morally 
expansive in a world of finite resources (i.e., time, money, and physical) often requires self-
sacrifice, which can create tensions between one’s own needs and the needs of others 
(Bastian & Crimston, in press). For example, an individual morally concerned for the welfare 
of animals may oppose factory farming, but to do so must accept paying higher food prices. 
Moral expansiveness captures a greater tendency and willingness to uphold such convictions, 
even when doing so incurs personal cost.  
Exploring Moral Expansiveness 
Our data provide insight into factors that are related to a morally expansive 
orientation to the world. Factors associated with moral expansiveness include: empathy, 
perceptions of the capacity for others to experience suffering, a sense of self as both moral 
and expansive in terms of belonging to superordinate identities, an inclusive value system, 
and moral intuitions that are not limited by a motivation to protect ingroup interests. To this 
extent, it appears that moral expansiveness may be associated with how we view the self, our 
values, and our ability to put ourselves in others’ shoes. However, moral expansiveness is not 
reducible to these constructs, leaving room for additional explanations for the variations and 
origins of moral expansiveness.  
One possibility worthy of further exploration is whether the origins of moral 
expansiveness may be found in our cognitive and social development. There is recent 
evidence to suggest we possess instinctual moral abilities essential for moral rights decision 
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making, these include: the ability to identify kindness from cruelty, to convey empathy and 
compassion, and a preference for fairness (Bloom, 2013; Hamlin, 2014; Hamlin, Wynn, & 
Bloom, 2007). Early in development these instincts operate within a more egocentric 
orientation, however this tends to give way to an increasing recognition of the rights and 
needs of others in line with an expanding social circle (Bloom, 2004, 2010). Such a process 
may start with a simple recognition of fairness and reciprocity within interpersonal 
interactions but can quickly extend to the emergence of care and concern for others more 
distant. Illustrating this point, children as young as six have been shown to struggle with their 
personal consumption of meat for moral reasons – acknowledging the ‘other entity’ suffering 
that is relevant to this judgment (Hussar & Harris, 2010). 
Therefore, it is possible that which entities we deem worthy of this expanded moral 
concern are largely socially and culturally determined. As Hirschfeld (1995) has 
demonstrated, preschool children see occupation to be as important as race in distinguishing 
between people, but in the absence of social support abandon this idea. In addition, race 
preference does not appear to be evident at birth, but instead develops as a result of learning 
and exposure (Kelly et al., 2005). It is possible that young children differentiate between 
specific categories in terms of moral judgments and value as a result of the moral distinctions 
made within their particular cultural environment. This also suggests that insights into moral 
expansiveness may be gained through cross-cultural comparisons of both children and adults. 
Beyond the expanded application of our rudimentary moral instincts, some have 
argued that creativity, cognitive flexibility, perspective taking, self-control, a desire for moral 
consistency, and reason are largely responsible for variation in the expansion of moral 
consideration and the concomitant reduction in violence across time (Bloom, 2010; Pinker, 
2011; Pizarro et al., 2006; Singer, 1981). For example, Singer (1981) suggested that our 
ability to reason could take us to a position of impartial morality, a vantage point from which 
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we are able to identify that our own interests are no more important than the interests of 
others. Akin to this is the notion that applying moral standards consistently and 
indiscriminately is critical to expanding one’s moral world (Singer, 1981). Whether the 
emergence of moral expansiveness can be traced to the development of these capacities 
would provide critical evidence for these claims.  
A consideration that is central to the above questions is what factors may moderate 
the extent of an individual’s moral concern. One possibility is that moral expansiveness is 
evident in cases where people’s basic needs have been met, allowing them to turn their 
attention and resources to more distant entities. In line with Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of 
needs, it may be that moral expansiveness can be understood as fulfilling the need for self-
actualization. A further implication is that when more primary needs are not being met, our 
moral worlds shrink. In line with this possibility, outgroup members are more likely to be 
seen as exploitable and underserving when resources are scarce (Opotow, 1990, 2011; Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), and meat-eaters have been shown to lower their attributions 
of moral value to a cow when they are about to consume beef (Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & 
Radke, 2012b). This suggestion is supported by the association between postmaterialism and 
values, with materialists more likely to prioritize nationalistic social values (e.g., national 
strength) and postmaterialists prioritizing universal values (e.g., equality) (Braithwaite, 
Makkai, & Pittelkow, 1996). When our basic needs are fulfilled our moral worlds may 
transform in ways that allow us to efficiently and effectively fulfill the needs of distant 
others. Based on the potentially moderating impact of needs fulfilment and cultural level 
materialism, moral expansiveness may be linearly associated with GDP in large cross-cultural 
samples.  
In our studies there was a relatively consistent order of moral priority: family, friends 
and ingroup members were seen as relatively central, whereas outgroup members and non-
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human targets were seen as relatively distal. This need not mean that people move along this 
continuum of moral concern in a uniform manner, and some individuals may give particularly 
high concern to some normatively distant entities, such as granting greater moral concern to 
the environment than to outgroup members. Thus, an expansive moral world could take 
multiple forms, and there may be particular patterns held by different sections of the 
community (e.g., as a result of cultural differences, dogs may vary from anthropomorphized 
companions to a food source). We expect nuances in moral priority may throw up additional 
insights in terms of the predictive utility of the MES (e.g., human vs. nonhuman decision 
making). 
Finally, future research might further explore the relationship between moral 
expansiveness and the dyadic approach to mind perception and morality (Gray et al., 2007). 
Here we have examined the relationship between moral expansiveness and experience, 
establishing a moderate association between the two constructs. However, in combination 
with experience, the perceived agency of various entity groups may also contribute to their 
placing within the moral world. For example, “villains” are consistently placed outside the 
moral boundary: is this low moral standing a result of these targets being denied experience, 
or alternatively are they perceived to be deserving of punishment for violating their moral 
responsibility? Further exploring these relationships will no doubt form a compelling avenue 
for future research. 
Summary 
The extent to which people are expansive in their moral concern is a critical issue. 
Based on the findings of the current research and the questions still to be explored, moral 
expansiveness can make a unique theoretical and practical contribution to the field of moral 
psychology. We hope that this research will develop a new psychological understanding of 
our boundaries of morality, and the consequences of moral inclusion. On a practical level, our 
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work provides a clearer picture of the factors that influence global humanitarian concern and 
action, and greater care and protection for non-human animals and the environment. At a time 
when these matters are increasingly at the forefront of the social and political landscape, 
understanding moral expansiveness may be integral to addressing diverse social and moral 
issues.   
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Note
1  Initially we also incorporated an “objects” category, including entities such as rocks. After 
reviewing responses, it became clear that most participants struggled with thinking about the 
moral standing of objects. As result of this, and due to the low alpha of the objects category 
(α = .54), these entities were not included in the scale beyond this point. Note also that slight 
adjustments were made to a small number of MES entities from Study 3 onwards; “parent” 
was changed to “family member” in order to represent a non-specific member of kin, “friend” 
was changed to “close friend” in order to emphasize a very close non-kin member.   
 
2 MES instructions for Studies 1-3 can be found in Appendix A. Instructions for Studies 4-6 
in Appendix B. MES instructions were streamlined from Study 4 onwards and the term 
sacrifice was removed to reduce any potential overlap between the MES and criterion 
measures.  
 
3 Participants were deemed to not be engaging with the MES task where “villains” had higher 
MES scores than family/and/or ingroup members. 
 
4 Political conservatism was not included as a control variable in the regressions for Studies 2 
and 3. Because political conservatism is known to be highly correlated with the “binding” 
moral foundations, it was identified as a potential covariate. This allowed for a cleaner 
interpretation of the predictive strength of the MES relative to moral foundations. However, 
the inclusion of political conservatism does not change the conclusions drawn from Studies 2 
and 3.  
5 Participants were deemed to be not engaging with the self-sacrifice criterion task where 
reported willingness to sacrifice themselves to save people in prison was greater than people 
from their hometown. An additional case was removed prior to analysis outside of previous 
exclusion criteria as this participant indicated that their responses, particularly to the key 
criterion measure, were strongly influenced by their current personal circumstances (i.e., 
currently experiencing self-harming thoughts) – making their responses unreliable. 
  
6 The identification with all humanity scale was not selected in Study 6 because the 
behavioral criterion focused on non-humans.  
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Table 1  
Means, standard deviations and correlations between the MES and individual entity groups, Study 1 
 Mean/SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. MES 44.21 (12.30) - - - - - - - - - - - 
2. Family/friends  8.90 (0.40) .15 - - - - - - - - - - 
3. Ingroup 6.40 (1.58) .64*** .15 - - - - - - - - - 
4. Revered 5.39 (1.68) .74*** .20* .70*** - - - - - - - - 
5. Stigmatized 5.35 (2.00) .71*** .13 .55*** .61*** - - - - - - - 
6. Outgroup  4.52 (1.92) .68*** .05 .64*** .66*** .66*** - - - - - - 
7. Animals (high 
sentience) 
3.85 (2.35) .78*** .17✝ .32*** .37*** 
.48*** .36*** - - - - - 
8. Environment 3.53 (2.39) .67*** .08 .23* .38*** .29** .15 .52*** - - - - 
9. Animals (low 
sentience) 
2.64 (2.30) .75*** .10 .22* .33*** 
.34*** .26** .81*** .54*** - - - 
10. Plants 2.52 (2.20) .71*** .06 .24* .36*** .24* .21* .55*** .78*** .66*** - - 
11. Villains 1.10 (1.77) .30** -.25** .23* .21* .25** .42*** .03 -.13 .08 .02 - 
***p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05        ✝ p<.10 
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Table 2  
Relationships between the MES, morality measures, and four criterion judgments, Study 2 
  
MES 
 
Human Moral 
Concern 
 
Non-Human 
Moral Concern 
 
Kidney 
Donation 
(Human) 
 
Financial 
Donation 
(Non-human) 
MES - .42*** .44*** .25** .35*** 
Moral Foundations      
care/harm  .26** -.01 .16✝ .09 .37*** 
fairness/cheating .09 -.08 .01 -.09 .19* 
ingroup/loyalty -.31** -.27** -.26** -.00 -.09 
authority/subversion -.27** -.44*** -.34*** -.11 -.16✝ 
purity/degradation  -.24** -.42*** -.16✝ -.26** -.08 
Moral identity      
Internalization .12 -.21* .02 -.16✝ -.03 
Symbolization .08 -.04 .14 .09 .18* 
Universalism Values .36*** .14 .31** -.05 .38*** 
***p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05        ✝ p<.10 
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Table 3 
Hierarchical regression predicting human and non-human moral concern judgments, Study 2 
 
 
 
Human Moral Concern 
 
 
Non-Human Moral Concern 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1 
 
                Step 2 Step 3  Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
ΔR2 .00 .32*** .08***  .04 .21** .08** 
   β           95% CI             β            95% CI        β 95% CI             β             95% CI             β            95% CI      β             95% CI 
Age -.02      [-0.21, 0.16] -.01 [-0.17, 0.16] -.05 [-0.20, 0.11]  -.02       [-0.20, 0.17] .01       [-0.17, 0.19] -.03 [-0.19, 0.14] 
Gender  .01      [-0.19, 0.21] -.01 [-0.19, 0.17] -.02 [-0.19, 0.15]  -.19
✝
     [-0.01, 0.38] .10       [-0.09, 0.28] .08 [-0.09, 0.26] 
Religiosity  -.06      [-0.26, 0.14] .30** [0.09, 0.50] .24* [0.05, 0.44]  -.16       [-0.35, 0.04] -.08       [-0.29, 0.14] -.13 [-0.34, 0.08] 
Moral Foundations           
care/harm  - -.00 [-0.23, 0.22] -.07 [-0.28, 0.15]  - .14 [-0.10, 0.38]  .08        [-0.15, 0.31] 
fairness/cheating - -.03 [-0.25, 0.19] .02 [-0.19, 0.23]  - -.17 [-0.40, 0.06] -.12       [-0.34, 0.10] 
ingroup/loyalty - .11 [-0.12, 0.34] .19
✝
 [-0.03, 0.41]  - -.07 [-0.31, 0.17] .01  [-0.22, 0.24] 
authority/subversion - -.43** [-0.73, -0.13] -.43** [-0.71, -0.15]  - -.36* [-0.67, -0.05] -.36* [-0.66, -0.06] 
purity/degradation  - -.29* [-0.54, -0.05] -.22
✝
 [-0.46, 0.01]  - .12 [-0.13, 0.38] .19 [-0.06, 0.44] 
Moral Identity             
Internalization - -.23* [-0.41, -0.05] -.23* [-0.40, -0.05]  - -.05 [-0.24, 0.14] -.04 [-0.23, 0.14] 
 Symbolization - .12 [-0.07, 0.31] .10 [-0.08, 0.27]  - .20* [0.00, 0.40] .18
✝
 [-0.01, 0.37] 
Universalism - .08 [-0.12, 0.28] -.00 [-0.20, 0.19]  - .21
✝
 [0.00, 0.42] .13 [-0.08, 0.33] 
MES - - .34*** [0.16, 0.51]  - - - .33** [0.14, 0.51] 
 
***p<.001  ** p<.01  * p<.05        
✝ p<.10 
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Table 4 
Hierarchical regression predicting kidney and financial donation judgments, Study 2 
 
 
 
Kidney Donation (Human) 
 
 
Financial Donation (Non-Human) 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1 
 
                Step 2 Step 3  Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
ΔR2 .01 .23*** .04*  .03 .26*** .03* 
   β           95% CI             β            95% CI        β 95% CI             β             95% CI             β            95% CI      β             95% CI 
Age  .04       [-0.15, 0.23] .06 [-0.12, 0.24] .03 [-0.14, 0.21]  -.04       [-0.22, 0.15] -.06       [-0.23, 0.12] -.08 [-0.25, 0.09] 
Gender .06      [-0.14, 0.25] .08 [-0.11, 0.27] .07 [-0.12, 0.25]  .17
✝
     [-0.03, 0.37]  .08       [-0.11, 0.26] .07 [-0.11, 0.25] 
Religiosity  -.01      [-0.21, 0.19] .15 [-0.07, 0.37] .11 [-0.11, 0.33]  -.02       [-0.21, 0.18]  .03       [-0.18, 0.24] -.00 [-0.21, 0.21] 
Moral Foundations           
care/harm  - .29* [0.05, 0.53] .25* [0.01, 0.49]  - .38** [0.14, 0.61]  .33**       [0.10, 0.57] 
fairness/cheating - -.17 [-0.40, 0.06]   -.14 [-0.37, 0.09]  - -.09 [-0.31, 0.13] -.06       [-0.28, 0.16] 
ingroup/loyalty - .15 [-0.09, 0.39] .20
✝
 [-0.04, 0.44]  - .01 [-0.23, 0.24] .06 [-0.18, 0.29] 
authority/subversion - -.01 [-0.32, 0.31] -.01 [-0.32, 0.31]  - -.13 [-0.44, 0.18] -.13 [-0.43, 0.17] 
purity/degradation  - -.46** [-0.72, -0.20] -.41** [-0.67, -0.16]  - -.03 [-0.28, 0.22] .02 [-0.23, 0.26] 
Moral Identity             
Internalization - -.23* [-0.43, -0.04] -.23* [-0.42, -0.04]  - -.24* [-0.42, -0.05] -.24* [-0.42, -0.05] 
 Symbolization - .22* [0.02, 0.42] .21* [0.01, 0.40]  - .15 [-0.04, 0.34] .14 [-0.05, 0.33] 
Universalism Values - -.17 [-0.38, 0.05] -.23* [-0.44, -0.01]  - .24* [0.03, 0.44] .18
✝
 [-0.03, 0.39] 
MES - - .23* [0.04, 0.43]  - - - .21* [0.02, 0.40] 
 
***p<.001  ** p<.01  * p<.05        
✝ p<.10
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Table 5 
 
Correlations among measures, Study 3 
 
 MES Overall 
SS 
Home 
town 
African 
Population 
Intellectual  
Disability  
Prisoners Chimps Ants Coral 
Reefs 
Redwood 
Trees 
MES - .25*** .17** .24*** .18** .20** .19** .11✝ .23*** .17** 
Moral Foundations           
care/harm  .28*** .17** .18** .17** .14* .15* .15* .01 .09 .01 
fairness/cheating .19** .08 .10 .13* .09 .09 .09 -.08 .00 -.09 
ingroup/loyalty -.10✝ -.04 .06 -.04 .00 -.06 -.05 -.06 -.08 -.13* 
authority/subversion -.22*** -.11✝ .00 -.11✝ -.04 -.09 -.12* -.11✝ -.14* -.17** 
purity/degradation  -.13* -.09 .01 -.07 -.05 -.06 -.14* -.06 -.13* -.14* 
Moral Identity           
Internalization .26*** .21*** .24*** .28*** .26*** .13* .12* -.08 .02 -.02 
Symbolization .06 .11✝ .18** . 12* .13* .01 .04 .06 .04 .01 
Universalism Values .38*** .16** .08 .14* .06 .10 .24*** .08 .21*** .13* 
Empathic Concern .24*** .28*** .29*** .33*** .29*** .25*** .17** -.02 .05 .01 
Perspective Taking 
 
 
.22*** .20** .22*** .25*** .19** .17** .08 -.03 .07 .05 
50 
Moral Expansiveness  
Identification with 
all Humanity 
.39*** .28*** .25*** .32*** .25*** .29*** .16** .07 .09 .08 
Connectedness to 
Nature  
.39*** .06 -.04 -.01 -.02 -.04 .17** .10
✝
 .20** .13* 
***p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 ✝ p<.10 
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Table 6 
Hierarchical regression predicting overall willingness to self-sacrifice, Study 3 
 
   
Overall Willingness to Self-sacrifice 
  
 
Step 1 
ΔR2    β            95% CI 
Step 2 
 ΔR2  β        95% CI 
Step 3 
ΔR2  β       95% CI 
Step 4 
 
ΔR2  β          95% CI 
  .02  .07** .06***  .02* 
Age -.06 [-0.18, 0.06] -.05 [-0.17, 0.08] -.02 [-0.14, 0.11] -.02 [-0.14, 0.10] 
Gender .05 [-0.07, 0.17] -.02 [-0.14, 0.10] -.03 [-0.15, 0.09] -.03 [-0.15, 0.08] 
Religiosity -.05 [-0.21, 0.11] -.05 [-0.21, 0.12] -.10 [-0.26, 0.06] -.10 [-0.26, 0.06] 
Afterlife .06 [-0.10, 0.22] .07 [-0.09, 0.23] .07 [-0.08, 0.23] .07 [-0.08, 0.23] 
Social Desirability  .10 [-0.02, 0.22] .05 [-0.07, 0.17] .04 [-0.09, 0.16] .04 [-0.09, 0.17] 
Moral Foundations        
care/harm  - - .12 [-0.04, 0.28] .08 [-0.08, 0.24] .06 [-0.10, 0.22] 
fairness/cheating - - -.07 [-0.24, 0.09] -.12 [-0.28, 0.04] -.10 [-0.26, 0.05] 
ingroup/loyalty - - .04 [-0.13, 0.20] -.01 [-0.18, 0.16] -.02 [-0.18, 0.15] 
authority/subversion - - -.10 [-0.29, 0.09] -.14 [-0.33, 0.05] -.10 [-0.29, 0.09] 
purity/degradation  - - -.11 [-0.27, 0.06] -.03 [-0.20, 0.13] -.04 [-0.20, 0.13] 
Moral Identity        
Internalization - -     .15* [0.02, 0.28] .09 [-0.05, 0.22] .06 [-0.08, 0.20] 
 Symbolization - - .09 [-0.04, 0.22] .08 [-0.05, 0.21] .09 [-0.04, 0.22] 
Universalism Values - - .06 [-0.09, 0.21] .05 [-0.13, 0.23] .03 [-0.15,0.20] 
Empathic Concern           - - -                - .15
✝
 [-0.03, 0.34] .18
✝
 [-0.01, 0.36] 
Perspective Taking            - - -                - -.01 [-0.16, 0.14] -.01 [-0.16, 0.14] 
Identification with  
all Humanity  
          - - -                - .21** [0.06, 0.35] .16* [0.01, 0.31] 
Connectedness to  
Nature 
          - - -                - -.15* [-0.30, -0.00] -.18* [-0.33, -0.03] 
MES - - -                - - - .16* [0.03, 0.29] 
***p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 ✝ p<.10 
 
 
52 
Moral Expansiveness  
Table 7 
Hierarchical regression predicting overall willingness to self-sacrifice, Study 4 
 
   
Overall Willingness to Self-sacrifice 
  
 Step 1 
ΔR2    β            95% CI 
Step 2 
 ΔR2  β        95% CI 
Step 3 
ΔR2  β       95% CI 
 
  .07  .01 .05*  
Age .07 [-0.16, 0.29] .06 [-0.17, 0.28] .06 [-0.16, 0.28] 
Gender -.05 [-0.26, 0.17] -.05 [-0.27, 0.16] -.05 [-0.26, 0.16] 
Religiosity .18 [-0.14, 0.49] .18 [-0.14, 0.50] .19 [-0.12, 0.50] 
Afterlife -.28
✝
 [-0.59, 0.02] -.28
✝
 [-0.59, 0.02] -.27
✝
 [-0.57, 0.03] 
Social Desirability  .14 [-0.08, 0.36] .14 [-0.08, 0.36] .08 [-0.14, 0.31] 
Experience  - - .07 [-0.15, 0.28] -.01 [-0.23, 0.21] 
MES - - -                - .24* [0.02, 0.47] 
 
 * p<.05 ✝ p<.10 
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Table 8 
Hierarchical regression predicting overall willingness to self-sacrifice, Study 5 
 
   
Overall Willingness to Self-sacrifice 
  
 Step 1 
ΔR2    β            95% CI 
Step 2 
 ΔR2  β        95% CI 
Step 3 
ΔR2  β       95% CI 
 
  .07  .04 .05*  
Age -.27* [-0.49, -0.05] -.30** [-0.52, -0.08] -.32** [-0.53, -0.10] 
Gender -.03 [-0.27, 0.21] -.05 [-0.28, 0.18] -.10 [-0.33, 0.14] 
Religiosity .18 [-0.16, 0.52] .16 [-0.17, 0.49] .19 [-0.15, 0.51] 
Afterlife -.10 [-0.45, 0.26] -.13 [-0.47, 0.22] -.12 [-0.46, 0.22] 
Social Desirability  .03 [-0.19, 0.24] .04 [-0.27, 0.19] -.02 [-0.25, 0.20] 
Warmth  - - .15 [-0.06, 0.36] .07 [-0.15, 0.29] 
Social Responsibility - - .22
✝
 [-0.02, 0.45] .18 [-0.05, 0.41] 
MES - - -                - .23* [0.003, 0.45] 
 
** p<.01 * p<.05 ✝ p<.10 
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Table 9 
Hierarchical logistic regression predicting joining the letter writing campaign, Study 6 
 
   
Joining the NhRP Letter Writing Campaign 
  
 Step 1 
  ΔR2       Exp(B)       95% CI 
Step 2 
 ΔR2     Exp(B)     95% CI 
Step 3 
ΔR2     Exp(B)     95% CI 
 
    .00   .20* .07*  
Age .99 [0.84, 1.15] 1.01 [0.85, 1.20]    1.00 [0.84, 1.20] 
Gender .81 [0.23, 2.82] 1.07 [0.26, 4.43] 1.24 [0.30, 5.17] 
Religiosity .94 [0.66, 1.33] .87 [0.59, 1.26] .85 [0.57, 1.27] 
Moral Foundations - Harm  - - 2.22 [0.80, 6.15] 2.35 [0.82, 6.73] 
Moral Identity - Internalization - - 1.69 [0.41, 6.91] 1.62 [0.38, 6.94] 
Universalism Values   3.98
✝
 [0.83, 19.17] 3.55 [0.67, 18.98] 
Empathic Concern   1.93 [0.54, 6.98] 1.55 [0.42, 5.71] 
Connectedness to Nature   .34 [0.08, 1.48] .27 [0.06, 1.27] 
MES - - -                - 1.06* [1.00, 1.11] 
 
* p<.05 ✝ p<.10 
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Figure 1. Normative pattern of entities on the MES, with more central positions indicating greater moral concern 
 
Appendix A 
The Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES) – Studies 1 - 3 
 
 
The Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES) – Studies 4 – 6 
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Appendix B 
 
MES Entity List (U.S.) 
Family/Friends  
Family member  
Close friend  
Partner/spouse  
Ingroup  
American citizen  
Somebody from your neighborhood  
Co-worker 
Outgroup  
Foreign citizen  
Member of opposing political party  
Somebody with different religious 
beliefs  
Revered  
U.S. President (position not 
specific individual) 
U.S. Soldier  
Charity worker  
Stigmatized  
Homosexual  
Mentally challenged individual  
Refugee  
Villains  
Murderer  
Terrorist  
Child molester  
Animals high-sentient  
Chimpanzee  
Dolphin  
Cow  
Animals low-sentient  
Chicken  
Fish  
Bee  
Plants  
Redwood tree  
Apple tree  
Rose bush  
Environment  
Coral reef  
Old-growth forest  
Grand Canyon National Park  
 
 
 
MES Entity List (Australian) 
Family/Friends  
Family member  
Close friend  
Partner/spouse  
Ingroup  
Australian citizen  
Somebody from your neighborhood  
Co-worker 
Outgroup  
Foreign citizen  
Member of opposing political party  
Somebody with different religious 
beliefs  
Revered  
Prime Minister of Australia 
(position not specific individual) 
Australian Soldier  
Charity worker  
Stigmatized  
Homosexual  
Mentally challenged individual  
Refugee  
Villains  
Murderer  
Terrorist  
Child molester  
Animals high-sentient  
Chimpanzee  
Dolphin  
Cow  
Animals low-sentient  
Chicken  
Fish  
Bee  
Plants  
Redwood tree  
Apple tree  
Rose bush  
Environment  
Coral reef  
Old-growth forest 
Uluru (Ayers Rock) 
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